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Since  January  1999,  according  to  the  law,  the  common  monetary  policy  for  all  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union (EMU) Member States should be decided by simple majority in the Governing Council 
(GC)  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB),  regarding  the  Euro  area  aggregate  conditions. 
Notwithstanding,  no  formal  vote  has  been  taken  until  today  and  a  consensus  solution  has  been  the 
officially announced practical rule, hiding different points of view fuelled by national divergences that 
might exist within Euro area. 
Assuming that EMU national central bankers take into account national perspectives from their home 
countries  when  they  vote  interest  rate  decisions  in  the  GC,  we  try  to  find  whether  there  have  been 
favourable conditions for the emergence of voting coalitions among them. In order to accomplish that 
purpose, for every month since January 1999 until August 2003, we applied cluster analysis techniques to 
national stances before GC meetings, which we describe using three variables. We found high stability in 
the  identified  cluster  structure,  particularly  since  August  2001,  favouring  the  emergence  of  alliances 
between national interests. In spite of that, it is likely that the strong strategic position enjoyed by the 
Executive Board of the ECB has been sufficient to a priori defeat any coalitions of opposing proposals on 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
Since January 1999, the common monetary policy for all the Economic and Monetary 
Union  (EMU)  Member  States  is  decided  by  the  Governing  Council  (GC)  of  the 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB),  which  comprises  the  six  members  of  the  Executive 
Board (EB) of the ECB and the national central bank governors of the (currently) twelve 
EMU Member States. 
According to the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the 
ECB,  monetary  policy  decisions  should  be  taken  by  vote  considering  only  the 
aggregated Euro area conditions, and regarding the principle ‘one person, one vote’. 
Notwithstanding, believing in ECB official announcements, no formal vote has been 
taken until today and a consensus solution has been the officially announced practical 
decision  rule,  hiding  national  divergences  and  possible  discussions  that  might  exist, 
although not publicly expressed because the meeting minutes are not provided. 
In this paper, we assume that each national central banker does not forget the conditions 
of his own country when he takes part of the dialogue in GC meetings, despite enjoying 
independence  from  national  political  authorities.  In  particular,  we  assume  that  each 
national central banker’s a priori stance at each GC meeting depends on three cross-
country heterogeneous variables: desired (ideal) interest rates, inflation aversion, and 
unemployment  rate
1.  In  this  context,  we  try  to  find  whether  GC  decisions  reflected 
solutions of truthful consensus or simply the outcome of an informal voting process that 
explicitly did not take place due to its likely results. We carry out this main purpose in 
four steps. The first one is to analyse in what extent there are reasons to think about 
different national interests in EMU. Secondly, considering a month-by-month analysis, 
during the first four years and eight months of activity of the ECB, we try to identify 
groups of countries with similar interests, applying cluster analysis statistical methods. 
In third place, we examine whether those differences and similarities have been stable 
or  not.  By  other  words,  we  intend  to  answer  the  question  whether  national  central 
bankers  have  shared  similar  stances  always  with  the  same  colleagues  or  not  at  GC 
meetings.  That  stability  is  important  as  we  want  to  know  whether  there  have  been 
favourable conditions for the formation of alliances (or coalitions) between national 
                                                 
1   Below, we explain why we have chosen these variables.  
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central  bankers,  determined  to  affect  monetary  policy  decisions.  Finally,  being 
identified any stable structure in national differences, we plan to investigate whether 
that could have affected EMU monetary policy decisions. 
This  paper  is  organized  into  four  sections,  and  two  appendices,  besides  references 
section.  The  next  section  reviews  the  literature,  describes  three  sources  of 
heterogeneities between EMU Member States, and explains how those sources are taken 
into account by national central bankers in the GC meetings. In the third section, we 
present the empirical work, defining each used variable, providing and discussing the 
results of the cluster analysis. The fourth section concludes. 
 
 
2 – DIVERGENT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EMU 
2.1 – Economic sources of heterogeneities in the EMU 
The decision to have a single currency and a common monetary policy in the EMU led 
to the creation of the ESCB and the ECB, which is the monetary policymaker for the 
Euro-area. According to the ESCB and ECB Statutes, EMU monetary policy should 
consider  the  Euro-area-wide  economic  conditions,  and  not  each  particular  national 
situation.  However,  at  present,  we  observe  twelve  national  realities  and  find  some 
divergent aspects that easily might challenge the idea of Issing that monetary policy “must 
fit  all”
  2.  This  context  may  motivate  the  emergence  of  conflicts  of  interest  about 
monetary  policy  decisions,  hard  to  uncover  because  the  ECB  does  not  reveal  the 
minutes of its GC meetings. 
The Statutes lay down the principle that each national central bank governor has to be 
independent from national governments and from other public authorities. In spite of it, 
one  cannot  put  apart  the  national-bias  hypothesis  according  to  which  each  national 
central bank governor is relatively sensitive to realities of his own country of origin, 
especially when he feels a relevant divergence between national conditions (and the 
subsequent reasonable monetary policy for his or her country of origin) and Euro-area-
wide  conditions
3.  Dornbusch,  et  al.  (1998)  considered  reasonable  to  assume  that 
                                                 
2   “Since monetary policy is indivisible, one size must fit all” (Issing, 2001, p. 450). 
3   On the ground of their nomination process, we do not assume that the six officials of the ECB’s 
Executive Board consider national interests; they rather regard the Euro-area-wide concerns.  
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national  central  bank  governors  might  respond  to  national  conditions  and  worries
4. 
Berger and De Haan (2002) and De Haan, et al. (2002) argued that it is possible that 
those national worries dominate European motives
5.  
Heinemann  and  Hüfner  (2002)  found  that,  between  1999  and  the  end  of  2001,  the 
members of the ECB’s GC considered the national divergences relatively to the Euro-
wide conditions in their monetary policy decisions. In a similar framework, but applied 
to the U.S. Federal Reserve System, Gildea (1992) and Knott (1986), focusing on the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  meetings  where  the  votes  had  been  no 
unanimous between 1960 and 1987, showed that Federal Reserve Bank presidents voted 
as regional delegates, as their preferences tended to reflect the regional, industrial and 
commercial interests. 
In the same context, Meade and Sheets (2002) concluded that the votes of the members 
of  the  FOMC,  from  1978  to  2000,  revealed  a  regional  bias  –  it  seems  that  their 
monetary  policy  decisions  took  into  account  the  development  of  regional 
unemployment levels. In the same work, these two authors argued that, between 1999 
and 2001, the monetary policy decisions of the ECB’s GC were not inconsistent with 
their regional bias hypothesis
6. 
The European Union (EU) (and the EMU) is not a natural union of States. It results 
from an effort to join different political, social and economic traditions, realities and 
practices.  In  the  EMU,  at  least  three  important  differences  between  Member  States 
might imply divergent national desired or ideal monetary policies. In the first place, 
having  experienced  dissimilar  historical  evolutions,  Member  States  show  different 
economic policy preferences, which would imply diverse economic policy measures. In 
this context, even though price stability had been accepted as the primary objective of 
monetary policy, several differences remain between the countries, e.g., regarding social 
aversion to inflation (see, e.g., Lippi and Swank, 1999; Hayo, 1998; and Scheve, 2004). 
Secondly, the existence of asymmetries in the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy implies that the same policy should have heterogeneous effects across Member 
                                                 
4   It seems that Alesina and Grilli (1991) suggested the same thing when they said that in the ECB 
organization scheme, each country would have the opportunity to participate and influence the policy 
choice through its own central bank governor. 
5   For a study about the effects of the persistence of national perspectives on the GC, see Grüner (1999). 
6   In the ECB case, Meade and Sheets (2002) performed an experiment inspired in their empirical results 
for the FOMC. They found that, in nearly every occasion of monetary policy change, the majority of 
GC members voted for a change in policy that can be justified in terms of the differential between 
their national inflation rate and the Euro-area average.  
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States. According to some authors (e.g., Clausen, 2001, and Clements et al., 2001), the 
EMU  would  lessen  those  asymmetries.  Notwithstanding,  this  question  is  of  utmost 
importance,  justifying  the  large  number  of  recent  research  works  on  the  subject
7. 
Generally, those studies only consider the three or four most important EMU countries, 
and apply econometric techniques to pre-EMU data. In spite of not presenting identical 
conclusions, they reveal some noteworthy cross-country heterogeneity in what respects 
to monetary policy transmission mechanisms. 
Finally, the state of the economy is not the same across all the EMU countries
8. In this 
context, Björkstén and Syrjänen (1999) showed that, despite the European Union (EU) 
had converged economically between 1992 and 1997, since then structural and cyclical 
divergences were identified, emphasizing the importance of fiscal policy (though legally 
limited by the Growth and Stability Pact). On the contrary, Artis, et al. (1999) argued 
that coordination of the business cycles had increased across most of the EU countries
9. 
In agreement with them, Agresti and Mojon (2001) found coincident business cycles in 
most of the European countries (except for the cases of Finland, Greece and Portugal). 
Nevertheless and unfortunately, they also found differences between the Euro-area as a 
whole  and  each  Member  state  regarding  some  variables  that  affect  the  relationship 
between the inflation and the output. 
 
2.2 – Individual a priori stance in the meetings of the Governing Council 
In the preceding section, we summarize some sources of economic divergences across 
EMU  Member  States  that  might  justify  different  stances  by  national  central  bank 
governors, even though not officially, when they meet to decide monetary policy. As 
mentioned above, we assume that each national central bank governor is sensitive to his 
own  country’s  interests,  taking  into  account  regional  economic  developments  and 
preferences of national society, even though he cannot receive instructions from the 
                                                 
7   At countries level: Barran, et al. (1996), Britton and Whitley (1997), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997), 
Dornbusch, et al. (1998), Ehrmann (1998), Peersman and Smets (1999), Gros and Hefeker (2000), 
Guiso, et al. (2000), Agresti and Mojon (2001), Clements, et al. (2001), Mihov (2001), van Els, et al. 
(2001), Mojon and Peersman (2001), Angeloni, et al. (2002), Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2002), Clausen 
and Hayo (2002), Gros and Hefeker (2002), and Peersman (2002). At regional level: Arnold (1999). 
Finally, the ECB, in its own interest, organized a Conference on the transmission of monetary policy 
in the Euro Area, in December 2001. 
8   The website “Euro Area Business Cycle Network” (€ABCN) provides updated information about the 
business cycles in the Euroland (cf. http://www.eabcn.org).  
9   Using  a  sample  of  nine  EU  countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and UK), and the USA, they presented evidence suggesting a common business cycle 
in Europe.  
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Government of his country
10. In particular, we consider that before a GC meeting, each 
national central bank governor builds his own a priori stance about the best monetary 
policy decision, which for him, should consist in what is better for his country
11. 
At the GC meeting, the a priori stance of a national central bank governor can change, 
when he takes notice of the a priori stances of the other GC national members
12. The 
probability of change of his mind depends on the distance between his stance and the 
others’
13.  When  all  the  national  central  bankers  behave  in  this  way,  they  could  be 
building  alliances  or  coalitions  of  interests.  If  interests  are  relatively  dissimilar,  the 
abovementioned probability will be small, and the conditions to build alliances will be 
weak. On the other hand, if we observe high and stable similarity between positions, 
which empirically means the identification of some stability in the structure of each 
cluster of countries, we will be observing favourable conditions for the emergence of 
coalitions. Notwithstanding, we are aware that the presence of similar positions is not 
per  se  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  formation  of  alliances.  In  order  to  be  formed, 
coalitions must also be likely winning coalitions; if this is not the case, members do not 
have incentives to accept taking part of a (loose) coalition. 
In the next sections, we present the variables that were taken into account to describe 
the a priori position of each national central banker in GC meetings, and the results of 
the performed cluster analysis. 
 
 
3 – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
To accomplish our purposes, we focused our analysis on the twelve countries whose 
national  central bankers  hold  a  seat  at  the  ECB’s  GC  meetings.  In  order  to  have  a 
picture  of  each  country  every  month,  since  January  1999  until  August  2003  (56 
months), which would had had influenced the a priori stance of each national central 
                                                 
10   In  reality,  in  this  assumption,  it  is  only  necessary  to  consider  that  national  central  bankers  are 
influenced by their countries’ conditions to a greater extent than the Executive Board members. 
11   Mangano (1999) postulating the a priori formation of voting coalitions and using standard measures 
of voting power, tried to quantify the relative influence of individual members of EMU on monetary 
policy decisions. 
12   This our assumption of dynamic change of individual stances at ECB breaks with traditional spatial 
coalition formation theories, and accompanies ‘Dynamic Spatial Coalition Formation Theory’ (see, 
e.g., de Ridder and van Deemen, 2004). 
13   In the empirical work presented in this paper, this distance was measured by the (squared) Euclidean 
distance between the position of a national central banker (defined by the values of three attributes 
explained below) and each others’ positions (see section 3).  
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bank governor before the GC meetings, we took into account three variables: national 
desired interest rate, unemployment rate, and inflation aversion of the society. While the 
first  two  change  month  by  month,  the  latter  is  constant  across  our  sample,  as  it 
represents something more structural in national motivations. 
Artis  and  Zhang  (1998  and  2002),  using  the  same  statistical  methods  but  different 
variables from ours, tried to find whether, in the light of traditional theory of optimal 
currency areas criteria, the prospective (in 1998) EMU appeared to be a homogeneous 
group of countries. They found three groups in EMU: a core group revolving around 
Germany,  which  comprises  Austria,  Belgium,  France  and  Netherlands,  and  two 
peripheral groups – a “Northern group” containing the Scandinavian countries together 
with the UK and Ireland, and a “Southern group” containing Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. 
 
3.1 – Variables 
3.1.1 – DESIRED INTEREST RATES 
In this paper, the first considered variable is the “desired interest rate” for each country, 
which consists in the ideal monetary policymaker’s response to output gap and inflation. 
We take for granted that, before the GC meeting each national central bank governor 
computes the current desired interest rate (
*
t i ) for his own country, following a very 






t i ) ( i i ⋅ − + ⋅ = − ρ ρ 1 1   (1) 
where 




TAYLOR x r i ⋅ + − ⋅ + + = β π π α π   (2) 
 
According to Taylor (1993), one of the inputs to central bank decision-making consists 
in an interest rate ( TAYLOR i ), computed as a reaction to deviations of contemporaneous 
inflation rate ( t π ) from an inflation target (
* π ), and to output gap ( t x ) (deviation of 
                                                 
14   Despite some criticisms pointed to the Taylor rule (e.g., Svensson, 2003), we use it in this paper in 
order not to make monetary policy or to extract prospective conclusions, but only with the purpose to 
compute which should have been the most suitable interest rate for each EMU Member State and for 
the whole Euro-area (11/12 countries). We have chosen this rule because, according to the literature, 
simpler rules are more robust than other more complex ones, across a variety of models (Taylor, 1999; 
Eleftheriou, 2003). Moreover, “Taylor rule captures reasonable well what central banks desire” (De 
Grauwe, 2003a, p. 113).  
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real  output  from  its  long-run  potential  level),  given  the  equilibrium  long-term  real 
interest rate (
* r ) (neutral real interest rate). 
We state that the desired interest rate (
*
t i ), in month t, corresponds to a  smoothing 
description  of  the  Taylor  type  desired  interest  rate  (equation  2).  We  consider  a 
smoothing parameter ( ρ ), in order to include explicitly the idea of optimal monetary 
policy inertia, to reduce the effects of some data uncertainty (Orphanides, 1998), and to 
allow a learning process by the monetary policymaker. 
Some authors (e.g., Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2003) argue that we should incorporate a 
kind of forward-looking behaviour of the policymaker in the rule. However, we do not 
take into account that suggestion and we rely on Taylor (1999)’s arguments, according 
to which forward-looking rules depend on current and lagged data, reason to say that 
inflation forecasts rules are not more forward-looking than rules that explicitly react to 
current and/or lagged variables. 
Following equation (1), we computed desired interest rates, from January 1999 until 
August 2003, for Euro-area and all the twelve EMU Member States. 
We set the weights to inflation and to output gap with the same values as in the original 
work  of  Taylor  (1993),  respectively,  5 0. = α   and 5 0. = β
15.  Following  some  results 
from the literature
16, we assumed 9 0. = ρ , % r
* 2 =  and  %
* 2 = π  (which coincides with 
the current inflation value reference of the ECB). These values are equal for all the 
countries, which mean identical preferences
17. 
The  output  gap  (at  month  t)  is  defined  as:    1 - )         t t t GDP potential / GDP real ( x = . 
Because real GDP monthly data is not statistically available, we used monthly OECD 
seasonally adjusted industrial production for all the countries
18. In order to compute the 
potential  output,  we  applied  the  Hodrick-Prescott  (1997)  filter  to  that  industrial 
                                                 
15   Recent research has revealed that these parameters have such estimated values (Alesina, et al., 2001). 
16  Estimated  values  for  the  smoothing  coefficient  revealed  that  in  the  case  of  quarterly  data, 
80 0 60 0 . . ≤ ≤ ρ , while for monthly data,  90 0. = ρ . 
17   Even  assuming  that  national  governors  share  similar  preferences  about  inflation  and  output 
stabilization, sole the different economic conditions that characterize their countries may be sufficient 
to lead them to defend different stances on monetary policy in the GC meetings. 
18   As an alternative for the use of the monthly industrial production data, recognizing that monetary 
policymakers  ought  to  focus  on  overall  GDP  and  not  only  in  industrial  production,  we  tried  to 
compute monthly real GDP applying a linear interpolation method to seasonally adjusted quarterly 
real GDP data, following Eleftheriou (2003). Apart an higher smoothing of the values, we did not find 
better results with this transformed data than with the original monthly seasonally adjusted index of 
industrial production. Therefore, we rely in the latter data.  
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production data (January 1980 – August 2003)
19. The inflation rate in month t is defined 
as:  1 12 − = − ) HICP / HICP ( t t t π . 
The  computed  desired  interest  rates  are  in  Appendix  1.  In  the  Figure  1.1,  we  also 
represent the behaviour of the ECB’s main refinancing rate
20. It is worth to mention the 
outlier performance of two countries – Ireland especially from the third quarter of 2000 
onwards, and Greece, before join the EMU group (January 2001). If we exclude both 
countries from the analysis, we will find a close behaviour of desired interest rates, 
roughly  describing  a  fluctuations  tunnel.  However,  within  that  tunnel,  important 
differences remained between the countries. 
We may register that, since the first quarter of 2001 and regarding only their desired 
interest rates, Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and less evidently, Spain, tend to 




3.1.2 – UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
In this exercise, we assume that the unemployment rate of each country has a role to 
play in the definition of the a priori stance of each national central banker before the 
GC meetings, especially due to two reasons. In the first place, it is different across EMU 
countries, being used as a differentiation variable between them. In second place and 
more  importantly,  it  represents  one  of  the  most  important  concerns  of  European 
citizens.  According  to  Eurobarometer,  a  European  public  opinion  survey  report,  the 
problem of unemployment is at the top of the list of the most cited European Union 
priorities. During the period of our sample, when asked to mention the most important 
problems  faced  by  their  countries,  around  42%  of  the  polled  European  citizens 
answered “unemployment”, with crime in second place. And nine out of ten of them 
                                                 
19   The results are available from the author on request. We performed HP filter, using EVIEWS software 
(version 3.1), with a smoothing parameter 14400 = λ  for monthly data, as suggested by Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997). Nevertheless, it is worth noting the careful that should be put in the estimation of the 
output gap (e.g., Kozicki, 1999 and Smets, 1998). 
20   Before June 8
th 2000, it was called “rate on main refinancing operations”. In that date, as a response 
to the high overbidding that had developed in the context of the fixed rate tender procedure, the 
ECB’s GC decided that, onwards, the main financing operations would be conducted as variable rate 
tenders, applying the multiples rate auction procedure. From that date, the GC in its meetings takes 
decisions on the “minimum bid rate” for the main refinancing operations. 
21   As can be seen in Figure 1.1 (Appendix 1), while the Euro-area desired interest rate (as well as the 
rate decided by the GC) were increasing (until the first quarter of 2001), all of the nationally desired 
rates moved together. Onwards, some of them begun to diverge.  
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reported that fighting unemployment should be a European Union priority
22. Across 
countries, the fear of rising unemployment and the desire to control it increases with 
experiences of relatively high unemployment rates. 
 
3.1.3 – INFLATION AVERSION OF THE SOCIETY 
The  two  already  described  variables  change  month  by  month  as  both  illustrate  the 
behaviour of each national economy in each month. The third considered variable – 
inflation aversion of the society – does not change during our sample. We use this 
variable with two aims. In first place, when computing the desired interest rates, we 
assumed equal preferences across all the countries, which is far from reality. Therefore, 
we  consider  inflation  aversion  as  a  correction  in  direction  of  reality.  Secondly,  we 
assume that when building his a priori stance before GC meetings, each central banker 
is influenced by his own aversion to inflation, which should reflect the average aversion 
of his country’s society
23.  
Several studies have shown cross-country differences in inflation aversion, which is part 
of the economic culture of a country that stores its historical experience (Hayo, 1998). 
Germany is the most often-cited example in the literature for its high level of society’s 
inflation  aversion,  where  the  people’s  attitudes  reflect  high  inflation  episodes 
experiences. In fact, as Scheve (2004, p. 5) suggests, “if the proportion of individuals 
more exposed to the costs of inflation (unemployment) is greater in one country than 
another, then average inflation aversion in that country can be expected to be higher 
(lower)”. 
While  not  directly  measured,  researchers  have  tried  essentially  three  alternative 
procedures to find relevant information about the aversion to inflation. The first one is 
to  collect  directly  information  in  database  results  of  public  opinion  polls  (e.g., 
Eurobarometer)
24.  The  second  one  consists  in  the  estimation  of  proxies  of  inflation 
aversion as weights in loss functions
25. The third approach consists in measuring the 
sensitivity of government popularity to inflation performance
26. 
                                                 
22   See Eurobarometer Reports (numbers 51-60). 
23   Alternatively, we could think about the inflation aversion as a proxy to the conservativeness of each 
national society and, ultimately, of the central banker, as he or she is chosen among national citizens. 
24   See, e.g., Hayo (1998), Scheve (2004), and Di Tella, et. al. (2001).  
25   See, e.g., Lippi and Swank (1999) and Collins and Giavazzi (1993). 
26   Hibbs, et al. (1982).  
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In this paper, we use the Scheve (2004, p. 15)’s results as a proxy to inflation aversion 
of each country. Using outputs from Eurobarometers and from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP), Scheve estimated the mean national differences of nineteen 
countries  relative  to  the  United  Kingdom,  regarding  the  priority  level  assigned  to 
inflation by population of each country of the European Union, after having controlled 




3.2 – Cluster Analysis Results 
In order to identify groups of countries whose national central bankers are expected to 
reveal  similar  a  priori  positions  before  GC  meetings,  we  used  cluster  analysis 
techniques
28 for eleven EMU Member States from January 1999 until December 2000, 
and for all the twelve members, Greece already included, from January 2001 onwards. 
Cluster  analysis  encompasses  a  number  of  different  classification  techniques  that 
combine  subjects  or  objects  into  groups  or  clusters  taking  into  account  their 
characteristics. Cluster analysis allows the definition of groups such that characteristics 
in each cluster are similar to each other; and that the characteristics of one group should 
be different from the characteristics of other groups or clusters
29. 
From the above description of the three variables that we used in the cluster analysis, 
we observe that “desired interest rates” and “unemployment rate” are always monthly 
variable; the third variable – “social inflation aversion” – has equal values across all the 
56 months. Therefore, changes in the composition of identified groups strongly depend 
on the two first variables. 
In the implementation of cluster analysis, we began with a standardization of the data in 
order to reduce bad effects in the definition of clusters that could be caused by different 
measurement units
30. In the exploratory phase, for each month, we tried to find the 
reasonable number of identifiable clusters, using several hierarchical methods (single 
linkage,  complete  linkage,  unweighted-pair  group  centroid  and  Ward’s  method)  to 
ensure  that  the  results  are  robust.  Finally,  we  applied  the  k-means  non-hierarchical 
method. We present the results in the Appendix 2 (Table 2.1). 
                                                 
27   See Table 1.3, and included explanations. 
28   We  implemented  cluster  analysis  in  STATISTICA  software  (version  5.5),  and  confirmed  the 
robustness of founded classifications using the SPSS software (11.50). 
29   See Sharma (1996) for details about cluster analysis and other applied multivariate techniques. 
30   The  standardization  of  the  data  consists  in  transform  each  X  variable  into  Z,  such  that: 
σ   / ) X ( Z − = , in order to have the three variables equally weighted.  
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The cluster analysis revealed some interesting points.  
During the 56 analysed months we did not find always the same cluster structure: both 
the  number  of  clusters  and  their  internal  structure  show  some  variability  across  the 
period. However, regarding the stability of identified groups of national interests, we 
can split the period into two sub-periods: the first, from January 1999 until July 2001, 
and the second, from August 2001 until May 2003. 
The  first  sub-period  showed  some  small  periods  (two  to  five  months)  of  relatively 
stability, though broken by some variation in the composition of each cluster. In this 
first sub-period, the two less unstable clusters were formed by Austria and Luxembourg 
and by Belgium, Finland and France. 
The second sub-period was characterised by an higher stability in the composition of the 
identified groups of national interests. During those continuous 22 months, only broken 
one  time  (November  2001),  we  identified  always  the  same  four  clusters:  ({Austria, 
Luxembourg};  {Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Italy};  {Greece,  Spain};  {Netherlands, 
Ireland}) and two isolated countries: Germany and Portugal. In this second sub-period, 
we  observed  that  while  Germany  is  relatively  distant  from  identified  clusters, 
Portuguese national interests are more close to the interests of two clusters formed by 
Netherlands and Ireland, and by Austria and Luxembourg, than to other clusters’. This 
result is a little strange when we take into account the literature that generally classifies 
Portugal in the Southern periphery of EMU (e.g. Artis and Zhang, 1998 and 2002). 
Besides  that  possible  division  into  two  different  sub-periods,  observing  the  cluster 
dynamics across all the 56 months, three remarks are noteworthy. The first remark is 
about  the  existence  of  isolated  national  interests.  We  observed  that  Germany  was 
always  an  isolated  country;  it  never  joined  any  group  of  countries.  In  spite  of  it, 
Germany was less distant from the cluster formed by Austria and Luxembourg than 
from other clusters, especially during the second mentioned sub-period. Portugal was 
the second more frequently isolated country (44 months). 
The second observation is about some sets of countries that showed particular closeness 
in their national positions. Austria and Luxembourg formed almost always the same 
group of national interests. They belonged to the same cluster in 41 out of 56 months: 
from January 1999 until September 1999; from November 2000 until April 2001; and 
from July 2001 until August 2003. Another group with very similar interests during all 
the  two  abovementioned  sub-periods  was  formed  by  Belgium  and  France,  which  
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frequently joined another very stable two countries cluster comprised by Finland and 
Italy (particularly from July 2001 onwards). 
Finally, the third remark is about Spain. Across all the analysed months, this country 
showed a very interesting behaviour. We identified a cluster comprised of this country 
and Greece, every month, after the latter had adhered EMU. Before that date, Spain 
when joining a cluster it was almost always with Italy. 
 
 3.3 – Discussion of the results 
From data, we identified monthly differences between EMU Member States.  
From cluster analysis, assuming that the interests of each Member State are defined by 
its desired interest rate, its unemployment rate and inflation aversion of its society, we 
found two different sub-periods regarding the stability of identified groups of national 
interests. In the first sub-period, characterised by very small periods of stability in the 
composition  of  identified  clusters,  alliances  of  national  interests  would  have  been 
difficult to emerge in the GC. On the contrary, the second sub-period higher stability in 
the identified clusters would have created favourable conditions for the emergence of 
those stable coalitions or alliances. 
Focusing our attention in the second sub-period, we have to answer two final related 
questions: First, has the clearly identified stability within the second sub-period had 
effects  on  monetary  policy  decisions  in  the  GC  meetings?  Second,  have  monetary 
policy decisions expressed truthful consensus solutions? 
Within actual GC’s voting rules and current dimension of EMU and GC, a winning 
proposal  on  monetary  policy  decisions  needs  nine  votes.  In  this  framework,  it  is 
relatively easy for the EB members to find support for any proposal on interest rates and 
to defeat any opposing  coalition of national interests, as they enjoy of a very  good 
strategic position (Aksoy, et al. 2002). The approval of EB members’ joint proposal 
only requires three additional votes.  In other words, its defeat requires an opposing 
coalition  of  at  least  ten  national  central  bankers,  which  is  very  unlikely  despite  the 
identified stability in cluster analysis. Focusing our attention on all the meetings of the 
abovementioned  second  sub-period,  we  see  that,  in  all  occasions  of  interest  rates 
changes
31,  EB  members  had  no  problem  to  find  support  for  their  proposal,  at  least 
                                                 
31   In 2001: August, 31
st; September 18
th; November 9
th. In 2002: December 6






regarding the signal of the change of interest rates. Therefore, our answer to the first 
question  is  that  it  seems  that  identified  stability  in  cluster  analysis  had  no  obvious 
effects on monetary policy decisions. However, it does not mean that GC decisions are 
expressions of truthful consensus such as it is publicly announced by ECB. It is rather 
the outcome of a voting process that informally takes place at GC meetings and where 
no winning opposing coalition has ground to emerge. 
As long as the voting rule and the dimension of the GC remain in the same format, we 
do not expect any difficulties to EB. Problems will appear with EMU enlargement to 
twenty-five Member States. On February 3
rd 2003, the GC of the ECB unanimously 
approved a recommendation on an adjustment of voting modalities in the GC, “in order 
to ensure that the Governing Council will be able to take decisions in a timely and 
efficient manner even after a future large-scale enlargement of the euro area” (ECB, 
2003,  p.  73).  According  to  that  adjustment  of  voting  rules,  it  should  be  adopted  a 
rotating mechanism with a two class voting scheme in an intermediate stage and three 
class voting with the complete enlargement. 
In the final stage of enlargement, the GC would be comprised of twenty-one members: 
six members of the EB, plus some national central bankers classified into three groups, 
according to a country ranking. This ranking is built considering, in first place, the share 
of a Member State in the aggregate Gross Domestic Product of EMU, and secondly, the 
size of a Member State’s financial sector. The literature has written about this reform, 
but there remains a gap in that discussion. Besides other very important comments and 
critiques, it is noteworthy to recall ideas from this paper and ask whether the suggested 
aggregation of countries into those referred three classes is compatible with the natural 
aggregation of preferences that naturally central bankers do and that we can observe 
through cluster analysis. 
Today, it is necessary to analyse and study whether in the future GC meetings, after 
enlargement takes place, it will be possible or not that coalitions of similar interests 
emerge and affect the monetary policy decisions




                                                 
32   “Proposals for reform of the GC’s voting structure should consider in detail  the ramifications of 
national biases on European monetary policy and potential voting structures that act to minimize these 
biases.” (Meade and Sheets, 2002, p. 21).  
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4 – CONCLUSIONS 
Since January 1999, the monetary policy for the Euro-area is decided by the Governing 
Council (GC) of the European Central Bank (ECB). According to the Statutes of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB, decisions on interest rates 
should  merely  take  into  account  the  Euro-area-wide  conditions,  disregarding  all  the 
national conditions even though these require other kind of monetary policy decisions. 
Notwithstanding,  in  this  paper,  we  took  the  view  that  each  national  central  bank 
governor that hold seat at the GC’s meetings regards the economic and social conditions 
of his own country, when he takes part of those meetings. 
In this paper, we tried to analyse the divergences and convergences of interests of all the 
twelve  EMU  Member  States.  With  that  purpose  in  mind,  we  analysed  the  monthly 
relative position of each country, from January 1999 until August 2003, considering 
three variables. The first was the desired interest rates by each EMU Member State, 
which  we  computed  based  on  a  smoothing  version  of  the  Taylor  rule.  The  second 
variable was the inflation aversion of the society, using the estimated results of Scheve 
(2004). The third variable was the unemployment rate of each EMU Member State. 
We  applied  multivariate  statistical  cluster  analysis  techniques  in  order  to  find 
homogeneous  (or  similar)  groups  of  countries,  month-by-month,  using  those  three 
mentioned variables. We found that the 56 months could be divided into two distinct 
sub-periods: the first, from January 1999 until July 2001; and the second, from August 
2001 until the end of our sample. In this second sub-period, we found stable structure of 
national  interests  and  a  smaller  number  of  groups  of  countries,  circumstances  that 
suggest  the  presence  of  favourable  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  coalitions  or 
alliances among national central bankers from countries with similar positions about 
what should had been the best monetary policy decisions. 
We  also  tried  to  find  whether  that  stable  structure  of  interest  had  influenced  the 
monetary policy decisions of the ECB’s GC. Our answer is no, because the Executive 
Board’s  members  have  an  extraordinary  strategic  power  in  the  GC  voting  process. 
Therefore,  even  though  there  have  been  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  alliances 
between similar countries, they have not existed or if they have existed, it had been 
apparently  without  success  or  they  have  had  no  reason  for  fight  for  changing  the 
Executive Board’s proposal on the direction of interest rates. Hence, monetary policy 
decisions by the GC do not express consensus solutions; rather they are the outcome of  
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an informal voting process where no winning opposing coalition has ground to emerge. 
Notwithstanding, the question of the formation of coalitions will be important when 
additional countries enter in the EMU. 
The  analysis  that  we  have  done  entails  several  limitations.  Improvements  in  the 
variables defining each central banker stance would likely produce better definitions of 
the groups of countries. In first place, we computed desired interest rates for each EMU 
Member  State,  assuming  equal  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanisms  and 
preferences. It would be worthwhile to estimate Taylor rules for all the countries, in 
order to compute desired interest rate that more closely reflect the true desires of the 
EMU  Member  States.  In  second  place,  we  considered  that  national  central  bankers, 
when building their individual a priori stance in the GC meetings, have had immediate 
access  to  economic  data  (output  gap,  inflation  rate  and  unemployment  rate),  which 
should not correspond to reality as there is some lag until data be available. Finally, 
further research will consist in extending this analysis incorporating United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Denmark and all the new European Union Members that will enter to the EMU 
group  as  well,  and  compare  the  results  with  the  enlargement  adjustment  process 
suggested by the ECB in May 2003, trying to see if the ECB solution for its “large 
number problem” is feasible according to the dynamics of the likely coalition forming.  
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APPENDIX 1 – VARIABLES 
Table 1.1 – Monthly Desired Interest Rates 
    Austria  Belgium  Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxem.  Netherl.  Portugal  Spain 
1999 
Jan  2.14%  2.24%  2.76%  1.81%  2.05%  7.63%  4.66%  3.78%  0.80%  3.67%  4.25%  3.83% 
Feb  1.94%  2.03%  2.67%  1.68%  1.82%  7.47%  4.61%  3.58%  0.71%  3.66%  4.45%  3.72% 
Mar  1.76%  2.09%  2.54%  1.61%  1.66%  7.22%  4.36%  3.43%  0.80%  3.65%  4.55%  3.69% 
May  1.64%  2.05%  2.58%  1.56%  1.62%  6.98%  4.06%  3.25%  0.99%  3.57%  4.71%  3.73% 
Apr  1.58%  1.81%  2.62%  1.50%  1.53%  6.68%  3.88%  3.10%  1.25%  3.47%  4.66%  3.69% 
Jun  1.53%  1.84%  2.53%  1.50%  1.45%  6.37%  3.73%  3.00%  1.34%  3.61%  4.76%  3.70% 
Jul  1.39%  1.76%  2.49%  1.49%  1.43%  6.22%  3.85%  2.99%  1.30%  3.61%  4.70%  3.76% 
Aug  1.38%  1.78%  2.31%  1.39%  1.46%  6.20%  3.79%  3.00%  1.86%  3.69%  4.71%  3.79% 
Sep  1.44%  1.93%  2.25%  1.44%  1.46%  5.96%  4.01%  3.05%  2.30%  3.66%  4.61%  3.89% 
Oct  1.45%  1.95%  2.14%  1.52%  1.54%  5.84%  4.32%  3.14%  2.74%  3.62%  4.58%  3.94% 
Nov  1.83%  2.17%  2.00%  1.68%  1.59%  5.68%  4.42%  3.25%  3.02%  3.64%  4.62%  4.11% 
Dec  2.05%  2.51%  2.54%  1.81%  1.73%  5.64%  4.69%  3.31%  3.55%  3.73%  4.64%  4.30% 
2000 
Jan  1.90%  2.28%  2.82%  1.98%  1.82%  5.57%  4.62%  3.38%  4.07%  3.71%  4.57%  4.44% 
Feb  2.04%  2.59%  2.98%  2.11%  1.96%  5.45%  4.53%  3.49%  4.27%  3.72%  4.23%  4.67% 
Mar  2.24%  2.90%  3.25%  2.30%  2.08%  5.52%  4.59%  3.66%  4.35%  3.75%  3.97%  4.87% 
May  2.36%  3.07%  3.43%  2.36%  2.19%  5.44%  5.01%  3.81%  4.68%  3.76%  3.41%  5.01% 
Apr  2.64%  3.48%  3.91%  2.54%  2.33%  5.40%  5.36%  3.99%  4.74%  3.87%  3.49%  5.20% 
Jun  2.96%  3.62%  4.15%  2.67%  2.41%  5.27%  5.69%  4.17%  5.11%  4.03%  3.50%  5.37% 
Jul  3.11%  3.53%  4.45%  2.86%  2.60%  5.14%  6.33%  4.30%  5.51%  4.21%  3.69%  5.53% 
Aug  3.38%  3.84%  4.67%  2.97%  2.72%  5.10%  6.67%  4.45%  5.65%  4.29%  4.13%  5.70% 
Sep  3.62%  4.13%  5.07%  3.12%  2.92%  5.05%  6.97%  4.58%  5.71%  4.37%  4.43%  5.82% 
Oct  3.71%  4.35%  5.52%  3.32%  3.07%  5.03%  7.55%  4.73%  5.73%  4.55%  4.61%  5.88% 
Nov  3.97%  4.85%  5.79%  3.53%  3.18%  5.12%  8.25%  4.92%  5.94%  4.68%  4.80%  6.19% 
Dec  4.15%  5.12%  6.07%  3.61%  3.45%  5.34%  8.66%  5.14%  6.39%  4.76%  4.97%  6.44% 
2001 
Jan  4.29%  5.33%  6.24%  3.66%  3.56%  5.52%  8.77%  5.22%  6.32%  5.12%  5.26%  6.35% 
Feb  4.44%  5.46%  6.33%  3.69%  3.73%  5.87%  9.32%  5.13%  6.33%  5.55%  5.42%  6.22% 
Mar  4.46%  5.50%  6.42%  3.74%  3.82%  5.85%  9.41%  5.15%  6.42%  5.93%  6.04%  6.15% 
May  4.54%  5.31%  6.09%  3.77%  3.92%  5.87%  9.53%  5.19%  6.14%  6.38%  6.01%  6.09% 
Apr  4.66%  5.23%  6.07%  3.94%  4.11%  5.97%  8.86%  5.27%  6.13%  6.77%  6.31%  6.16% 
Jun  4.67%  5.29%  5.94%  4.01%  4.23%  6.13%  8.80%  5.30%  6.03%  7.00%  6.50%  6.21% 
Jul  4.92%  5.15%  5.71%  4.09%  4.21%  6.20%  8.26%  5.23%  5.89%  7.21%  6.56%  5.94% 
Aug  4.89%  5.07%  5.67%  4.16%  4.28%  6.26%  8.02%  5.08%  5.66%  7.36%  6.68%  5.90% 
Sep  4.82%  4.87%  5.59%  4.10%  4.24%  6.35%  7.75%  4.94%  5.61%  7.53%  6.75%  5.70% 
Oct  4.78%  4.64%  5.41%  4.07%  4.08%  6.24%  7.29%  4.84%  5.54%  7.42%  6.84%  5.53% 
Nov  4.59%  4.39%  5.19%  3.89%  3.84%  6.11%  6.75%  4.65%  5.34%  7.46%  6.99%  5.37% 
Dec  4.33%  4.30%  4.86%  3.75%  3.68%  5.98%  7.11%  4.53%  4.76%  7.64%  7.01%  5.18% 
2002 
Jan  4.27%  4.34%  4.63%  3.83%  3.68%  6.14%  7.39%  4.43%  4.53%  7.67%  6.97%  5.16% 
Feb  4.18%  4.36%  4.42%  3.86%  3.59%  6.22%  7.27%  4.45%  4.40%  7.62%  6.65%  5.16% 
Mar  3.86%  4.41%  4.43%  3.87%  3.57%  6.41%  7.98%  4.46%  4.23%  7.58%  6.68%  5.17% 
May  3.95%  4.33%  4.53%  3.94%  3.49%  6.68%  7.87%  4.41%  4.27%  7.55%  6.75%  5.27% 
Apr  3.91%  4.27%  4.44%  3.86%  3.30%  6.66%  8.13%  4.45%  4.25%  7.45%  6.71%  5.34% 
Jun  3.87%  4.08%  4.49%  3.77%  3.19%  6.64%  8.39%  4.44%  4.29%  7.48%  6.67%  5.33% 
Jul  4.01%  3.94%  4.55%  3.72%  3.08%  6.63%  8.19%  4.49%  4.24%  7.40%  6.73%  5.38% 
Aug  3.78%  3.88%  4.46%  3.75%  3.08%  6.53%  8.11%  4.50%  3.93%  7.28%  6.69%  5.53% 
Sep  3.75%  3.85%  4.29%  3.73%  3.01%  6.36%  8.11%  4.58%  3.92%  7.24%  6.65%  5.58% 
Oct  3.74%  3.86%  4.24%  3.69%  2.97%  6.17%  8.03%  4.62%  3.99%  7.20%  6.75%  5.75% 
Nov  3.56%  3.80%  4.22%  3.70%  2.99%  6.33%  7.92%  4.69%  4.12%  6.98%  6.69%  5.86% 
Dec  3.36%  3.70%  4.17%  3.71%  2.88%  6.42%  7.48%  4.77%  4.03%  6.84%  6.67%  5.95% 
2003 
Jan  3.46%  3.63%  3.86%  3.63%  2.85%  6.11%  7.40%  4.80%  4.21%  6.66%  6.73%  6.01% 
Feb  3.51%  3.61%  3.90%  3.75%  2.89%  6.25%  7.53%  4.80%  4.38%  6.80%  6.78%  6.10% 
Mar  3.40%  3.54%  3.77%  3.84%  2.89%  6.29%  7.57%  4.84%  4.66%  6.57%  6.72%  6.15% 
May  3.43%  3.46%  3.61%  3.86%  2.86%  6.38%  7.56%  4.89%  4.77%  6.28%  6.61%  6.15% 
Apr  3.23%  3.25%  3.45%  3.73%  2.74%  6.63%  7.35%  4.86%  4.59%  5.98%  6.57%  6.03% 
Jun  3.18%  3.16%  3.32%  3.71%  2.64%  6.71%  7.12%  4.86%  4.43%  5.71%  6.46%  5.97% 
Jul  3.25%  3.18%  3.37%  3.75%  2.67%  6.72%  7.12%  4.96%  4.53%  5.41%  6.39%  5.94% 
Aug  3.05%  3.15%  3.32%  3.78%  2.59%  6.42%  7.42%  5.03%  4.63%  5.32%  6.33%  5.94% 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2 – Unemployment Rates 
    Austria  Belgium  Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxem.  Netherl.  Portugal  Spain 
1999 
Jan  4.1%  9.1%  10.6%  11.2%  8.6%  11.4%  6.4%  11.6%  2.4%  3.5%  4.7%  13.9% 
Feb  4.0%  9.1%  10.5%  11.2%  8.6%  11.4%  6.2%  11.5%  2.4%  3.6%  4.7%  13.7% 
Mar  4.0%  9.0%  10.4%  11.2%  8.5%  11.4%  6.0%  11.4%  2.4%  3.4%  4.7%  13.5% 
May  4.0%  8.9%  10.3%  11.1%  8.5%  11.9%  5.8%  11.4%  2.4%  3.2%  4.7%  13.2% 
Apr  4.0%  8.9%  10.1%  11.0%  8.5%  11.9%  5.8%  11.3%  2.4%  3.2%  4.7%  13.0% 
Jun  3.9%  8.8%  10.0%  10.9%  8.5%  11.9%  5.7%  11.3%  2.4%  3.1%  4.6%  12.7% 
Jul  3.9%  8.7%  10.0%  10.7%  8.4%  11.9%  5.6%  11.3%  2.4%  3.4%  4.5%  12.5% 
Aug  3.9%  8.6%  9.9%  10.6%  8.4%  11.9%  5.5%  11.2%  2.4%  3.4%  4.4%  12.6% 
Sep  3.9%  8.4%  9.9%  10.4%  8.3%  11.9%  5.4%  11.1%  2.4%  3.3%  4.3%  12.5% 
Oct  3.9%  8.1%  10.0%  10.3%  8.3%  12.1%  5.2%  11.0%  2.4%  2.9%  4.3%  12.2% 
Nov  3.9%  7.9%  10.0%  10.2%  8.2%  12.1%  5.1%  11.0%  2.3%  2.7%  4.3%  12.1% 
Dec  3.9%  7.7%  10.1%  10.0%  8.1%  12.1%  4.9%  11.0%  2.4%  2.8%  4.3%  12.1% 
2000 
Jan  3.9%  7.5%  10.1%  9.9%  8.0%  11.5%  4.8%  11.0%  2.4%  2.8%  4.3%  11.9% 
Feb  3.9%  7.3%  10.1%  9.8%  7.9%  11.5%  4.7%  10.9%  2.4%  2.9%  4.3%  11.8% 
Mar  3.9%  7.0%  10.0%  9.7%  7.9%  11.5%  4.6%  10.7%  2.4%  2.9%  4.2%  11.7% 
May  3.8%  6.9%  10.0%  9.5%  7.9%  11.2%  4.5%  10.6%  2.4%  3.0%  4.1%  11.5% 
Apr  3.7%  6.9%  9.9%  9.4%  7.8%  11.2%  4.4%  10.5%  2.4%  2.8%  4.0%  11.4% 
Jun  3.7%  6.8%  9.8%  9.3%  7.7%  11.2%  4.3%  10.5%  2.4%  2.8%  4.0%  11.4% 
Jul  3.6%  6.8%  9.7%  9.2%  7.7%  11.0%  4.2%  10.4%  2.3%  2.8%  4.1%  11.2% 
Aug  3.5%  6.7%  9.6%  9.1%  7.7%  11.0%  4.1%  10.3%  2.3%  3.0%  4.2%  11.2% 
Sep  3.5%  6.7%  9.6%  9.0%  7.7%  11.0%  4.1%  10.1%  2.3%  2.9%  4.1%  11.1% 
Oct  3.5%  6.6%  9.5%  8.9%  7.6%  10.4%  4.0%  10.0%  2.2%  3.0%  4.0%  11.0% 
Nov  3.5%  6.6%  9.4%  8.8%  7.6%  10.4%  3.9%  9.9%  2.1%  3.0%  3.9%  10.9% 
Dec  3.4%  6.6%  9.4%  8.7%  7.6%  10.4%  3.9%  9.9%  2.1%  3.1%  3.9%  10.8% 
2001 
Jan  3.4%  6.5%  9.3%  8.6%  7.6%  10.3%  3.8%  9.8%  2.0%  2.9%  4.0%  10.8% 
Feb  3.4%  6.5%  9.2%  8.6%  7.6%  10.3%  3.8%  9.7%  2.0%  2.8%  4.0%  10.7% 
Mar  3.4%  6.5%  9.1%  8.5%  7.7%  10.3%  3.8%  9.6%  2.0%  2.5%  4.1%  10.6% 
May  3.4%  6.6%  9.1%  8.5%  7.7%  10.4%  3.8%  9.5%  2.0%  2.3%  4.0%  10.6% 
Apr  3.5%  6.6%  9.0%  8.5%  7.7%  10.4%  3.8%  9.5%  2.0%  2.5%  4.0%  10.6% 
Jun  3.5%  6.6%  8.9%  8.5%  7.8%  10.4%  3.8%  9.5%  2.0%  2.5%  4.1%  10.6% 
Jul  3.6%  6.6%  9.0%  8.5%  7.8%  10.3%  3.8%  9.5%  2.1%  2.4%  4.1%  10.5% 
Aug  3.7%  6.6%  9.0%  8.5%  7.9%  10.3%  3.8%  9.4%  2.1%  2.4%  4.1%  10.5% 
Sep  3.7%  6.7%  9.1%  8.5%  8.0%  10.3%  3.9%  9.3%  2.2%  2.5%  4.1%  10.6% 
Oct  3.8%  6.9%  9.2%  8.5%  8.1%  10.6%  4.0%  9.3%  2.2%  2.5%  4.1%  10.6% 
Nov  3.9%  6.9%  9.2%  8.5%  8.1%  10.6%  4.1%  9.2%  2.3%  2.4%  4.1%  10.7% 
Dec  4.1%  6.9%  9.2%  8.6%  8.2%  10.6%  4.1%  9.1%  2.4%  2.4%  4.2%  10.8% 
2002 
Jan  4.1%  7.0%  9.2%  8.6%  8.3%  10.4%  4.2%  9.1%  2.4%  2.4%  4.3%  11.0% 
Feb  4.1%  7.1%  9.1%  8.6%  8.3%  10.4%  4.3%  9.1%  2.5%  2.4%  4.3%  11.1% 
Mar  4.2%  7.2%  9.1%  8.6%  8.3%  10.4%  4.4%  9.0%  2.5%  2.6%  4.4%  11.2% 
May  4.2%  7.3%  9.1%  8.7%  8.4%  9.9%  4.3%  9.0%  2.6%  2.6%  4.6%  11.2% 
Apr  4.3%  7.3%  9.1%  8.7%  8.5%  9.9%  4.3%  9.0%  2.7%  2.7%  4.7%  11.3% 
Jun  4.3%  7.3%  9.1%  8.8%  8.6%  9.9%  4.3%  9.0%  2.8%  2.7%  4.8%  11.3% 
Jul  4.3%  7.4%  9.1%  8.8%  8.6%  9.9%  4.4%  9.0%  2.9%  2.8%  5.0%  11.3% 
Aug  4.4%  7.4%  9.1%  8.9%  8.7%  9.9%  4.4%  9.0%  2.9%  2.8%  5.2%  11.4% 
Sep  4.4%  7.3%  9.1%  8.9%  8.7%  9.9%  4.4%  8.9%  2.9%  2.8%  5.5%  11.5% 
Oct  4.4%  7.5%  9.0%  9.0%  8.8%  9.6%  4.4%  8.9%  3.0%  2.9%  5.8%  11.4% 
Nov  4.3%  7.6%  9.0%  9.0%  8.9%  9.6%  4.4%  8.9%  3.1%  3.0%  6.0%  11.5% 
Dec  4.3%  7.7%  9.0%  9.1%  9.0%  9.6%  4.4%  9.0%  3.2%  3.0%  6.0%  11.5% 
2003 
Jan  4.3%  7.8%  9.0%  9.1%  9.1%  9.4%  4.5%  9.0%  3.3%  3.2%  6.1%  11.4% 
Feb  4.2%  7.8%  9.0%  9.2%  9.2%  9.4%  4.5%  8.9%  3.3%  3.4%  6.2%  11.4% 
Mar  4.3%  7.9%  9.1%  9.3%  9.3%  9.4%  4.5%  8.8%  3.4%  3.6%  6.3%  11.4% 
May  4.3%  8.0%  9.1%  9.3%  9.4%  9.2%  4.6%  8.7%  3.5%  3.7%  6.3%  11.3% 
Apr  4.4%  8.0%  9.1%  9.3%  9.3%  9.2%  4.6%  8.7%  3.6%  3.8%  6.4%  11.3% 
Jun  4.5%  8.1%  9.1%  9.4%  9.3%  9.2%  4.6%  8.6%  3.7%  3.8%  6.4%  11.3% 
Jul  4.5%  8.2%  9.1%  9.4%  9.3%  9.2%  4.7%  8.6%  3.8%  3.8%  6.3%  11.3% 
Aug  4.5%  8.2%  9.0%  9.4%  9.3%  9.2%  4.7%  8.5%  3.8%  3.9%  6.3%  11.3% 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3 – Inflation Aversion of the Society 
 
Country  Inflation aversion 
proxy  Country  Inflation aversion 
proxy 
Austria  - 0.318  Ireland  - 0.136 
Belgium  - 0.291  Italy  - 0.497 
Finland  - 0.570  Luxembourg    - 0.291 (
33) 
France  - 0.424  Netherlands  - 0.439 
Germany  0.296  Portugal  - 0.757 
Greece  - 0.252  Spain  - 0.185 
Source: Scheve (2004, p. 15) 
Asking whether macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries, and trying 
to  find  what  accounts  for  that  variation,  Scheve  (2004)  used  data  from  five  cross-
national  surveys  (Eurobarometer  and  International  Social  Survey  Program)  that 
included respondents in twenty advanced economies. In particular, he used data from 
the  responses  to  survey  questions  of  the  following  type:  What  do  you  think  your 
government  should  give  greater  priority  to,  curbing  inflation  or  reducing 
unemployment?  Recognizing  that  those  responses  would  depend  on  the  economic 
context in which the question was asked, Scheve (2004) controlled for that economic 
context. The values of the above Table 1.3 are logit regressions coefficient estimates for 
each  country  dummy  variable.  Since  in  the  Scheve  (2004)’s  analysis  the  baseline 
country respondent is from the United Kingdom (UK), the abovementioned estimates 
indicate mean national differences from the UK. We took into account these coefficient 
estimates as a proxy to inflation aversion in our exercise, keeping the values constant 
during our sample. 
 
 
                                                 
33   In the case of Luxembourg, for which Scheve (2004) does not provide any value, we assumed the 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2 – Cluster Analysis (Month-by-Month) 










{Austria, Luxembourg}   
{Belgium, Finland, France} 
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Table 2.2 – Cluster Analysis (Month-by-Month) (cont.) 
 












{Finland, Greece, Italy, 
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Table 2.2 – Cluster Analysis (Month-by-Month) (cont.) 
 
Month  Clusters with more than one country  One country clusters 
Jan 2003 
{Austria, Luxembourg} 
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